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An ADR Clause by Any Other Name
Might Smell as Sweet: England's
High Court of Justice Queens Bench
Attempts and Fails to Define What is
Not an Enforceable ADR Clause
Cable & Wireless Plc v. IBM United Kingdom Ltd.
I. INTRODUCTION
The High Court of Justice Queens Bench Division in England issued a ruling
that provides sweeping support for the use of Alternative Dispute Resolution
(ADR) in private pre-dispute contract clauses.' While this support might seem to
aid in developing the growing ADR movement in England, the judge may have
put the cart before the horse by enforcing a non-descript and broad ADR contract
clause that lacks the specificity needed to ensure a fair outcome. This decision
could be detrimental for disputing parties and the future of the ADR movement
itself.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
On December 20, 2000, IBM 3 entered into a twelve-year Global Framework-
ing Agreement (GFA) with Cable & Wireless (C&W) 4 to provide C&W with
information technology services. 5 The agreement set forth terms for recurring
comparison analyses of IBM's services and charges with the services and charges
of other like competitors to ensure competitiveness. 6 If the results of the analyses
demonstrated a discrepancy in services provided by IBM as compared to those
provided by like competitors, the GFA required IBM to initiate a plan of correc-
I. [2002] 2 All E.R. 1041 (Q.B. 2002); 2002 WL 31442553.
2. See id.
3. IBM develops and manufactures information technologies including computer systems, soft-
ware, networking systems, storage devices, and microelectronics. IBM - United Kingdom, About
IBM, at http://www.ibm.comlibm/ukl (last visited Oct. 20, 2003).
4. Cable & Wireless is a global telecommunications business providing high performance Internet
platforms and data services. Cable & Wireless UK, About Us, at
http://www.cw.com/aboutus/index.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2003).
5. C&W, 2002 WL 31442553 at *1.
6. Id. at *2. The terms of the analyses are laid out in Schedule 10 of the GFA through a process
known as "the benchmarking process." Id.
1
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tive action meeting with C&W's approval.7 If disputes arose as a result of these
analyses, the proposed corrective plans of action, or any other aspect of the con-
tract, the parties agreed to follow an accelerated ADR clause. Under the ADR
8clause, the parties first agreed to engage in good faith negotiations. If these nego-
tiations failed, then the parties were required to attempt resolution through an
unspecified ADR process.9
On February 28, 2002, a third party company, Compass Management Con-
sulting, commenced the first analysis of IBM services.' ° This resulted in a report
showing that IBM's charges exceeded those of like competitors.'' IBM de-
nounced the validity of the analysis and refused to initiate corrective plans of ac-
tion.' 2 C&W thereafter brought a claim against IBM requesting compensation for
the disparity between prices charged by IBM and their like competitors. 3 IBM
counterclaimed asserting the analysis was fundamentally flawed and invalid, 4 and
furthermore, that the court should stay the proceedings to allow the parties a
chance to attempt resolution through an ADR process as required by the GFA.' 5
The court chose to address the application for stay first, reasoning that any deci-
sion regarding the substantive issues claimed by both parties would be moot if the
parties successfully resolved the issues through ADR. 16
C&W asserted four theories for denying IBM's stay request. First, C&W
claimed that the court should not enforce the ADR clause because the clause was
analogous to an agreement to negotiate,' 7 an unenforceable provision in English
courts.'8 Second, C&W argued that the ADR clause was not binding because it
allowed the Parties to initiate court proceedings before exhausting the ADR provi-
sions.' 9 Third, C&W reasoned that IBM should not have the opportunity to re-
quest a stay because it had not requested ADR before itself initiated the court
7. Id. This is known as the "Benchmark Plan" and is laid out in paragraph 4 of Schedule 10 of the
GFA. Id.
8. Id. at *34. The good faith negotiation clause is laid out in clause 41.1 of the GFA and states,
"The Parties shall attempt in good faith to resolve any dispute or claim arising out of or relating to this
Agreement ... promptly through negotiations between the respective senior executives of the Parties
who have authority to settle the same pursuant to Clause 40." Id.
9. Id. at *4. The ADR clause is laid out in clause 41.2 of the GFA and states:
If the matter is not resolved through negotiation, the Parties shall attempt in good faith to resolve
the dispute or claim through an Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) procedure as recom-
mended to the Parties by the Centre for Dispute Resolution. However, an ADR procedure which
is being followed shall not prevent any Party... from issuing proceedings. Id.
10. Id. at *3.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. C&W claimed IBM owed it £ 31.5 million to £ 45 million according to C&W's reading of
the GFA. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at *1.
16. Id. at *1.
17. Id. at *4.
18. Id. at *5. Under English law, courts cannot enforce a good faith negotiation clause due to its
lack of certainty. Courtney & Fairbairn Ltd. v. Tolaini Bro. (Hotels) Ltd., [1975] 1 W.L.R. 297 (C.A.
1974); 1975 WL 41086. "If the law does not [recognizel a contract to enter into a contract ... it seems
to me it cannot Irecognize] a contract to negotiate." Id.
19. Id. at *5. The pertinent part of the ADR clause states, "However, an ADR procedure which is
being followed shall not prevent any Party or Local Party from issuing proceedings." Id. at *4.
[Vol. 2003
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proceeding. 20 And fourth, C&W stated that IBM waited too long to bring forward
the request.21 IBM defended its request for a stay by asserting that the ADR
clause resembled an arbitration clause, which unlike a good faith negotiation
clause, is enforceable.22
The High Court of Justice Queens Bench Division in England ruled that the
ADR clause was precise, clear, and enforceable, and therefore stayed the proceed-
ings for referral of the dispute to ADR. 2 3 The court explained that to hold other-
wise would undermine the general public policy of supporting contractual refer-
ences to ADR.24
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Enforcement of ADR Clauses in England
Over the centuries, enforcement of ADR clauses in England has slowly pro-
gressed. During the eighteenth century, English courts did not look favorably
upon private agreements to arbitrate disputes, reasoning that the court would oth-
erwise lose rightful jurisdiction over the disputes. 25  England's parliament re-
sponded to this cynicism by passing the Arbitration Act of 1698, authorizing judi-
cial enforcement of arbitration agreements, and providing the necessary authority
to force courts to do so. 26 A number of other arbitration acts have passed since,
developing a base for the enforcement of private arbitration agreements.27 Under
28these numerous arbitration acts, private agreements between parties to arbitrate
disputes are now routinely enforced by the courts of England.29
Arbitration is but one form of ADR.30 However, in the last ten years, English
courts have enforced a variety of other ADR processes based on case law relating
solely to the enforcement of arbitration clauses. 3' These decisions have shown an
attempt by the courts to promote the growing use and support of ADR by using
20. Id. at *5.
21. Id.
22. Id. at *8.
23. Id. at *8-9.
24. Id. at *7.
25. Richard Reuben, Public Justice: Toward A State Action Theor., of Alternative Dispute Resolu-
tion, 85 CAL. L.REV. 577, 599-601 (1997), citing Kill v. Hollister, 95 Eng. Rep. 532 (K.B. 1746).
26. Id. For a discussion of a similar change of heart in the United States, see infra Part III.B.
27. See Arbitration Act 1996, c. 23 (Eng.) (repealing and replacing half of the 1950 Arbitration Act),
Arbitration Act 1950, 14 Geo. 4, c. 23 (Eng.) (consolidating previous Arbitration Acts, including, but
not limited to the Arbitration Act 1889, Arbitration Clauses (Protocol) Act 1924 and the Arbitration
Act 1934).
28. See Arbitration Act 1950, 14 Geo. 4, c. 23 (Eng.); Arbitration Act 1975, c. 3 (Eng.) (addressing
the specific use of international arbitration agreements); Arbitration Act 1979, c. 42 (Eng.) (addressing
the specific area of judicial review of arbitration awards and opinions).
29. See Smith, Coney and Barrett v. Becker, Gray & Co., [1916] 2 Ch. 86 (C.A. 1915), 1915 WL
18791; W. Bruce, Ltd. v. J. Strong, [1951] 2 K.B. 447 (K.B. 1951), 1951 WL 11839.
30. ADR encompasses a large variety of processes including mediation, negotiation, early neutral
evaluation, mini-trials, and arbitration. See THE ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION PRACTICE
GUIDE (Bette J. Roth et al. eds., 1993).
31. See Halifax Fin. Serv. Ltd., v. Intuitive Sys. Ltd., 119991 I All E.R 303 (Q.B. 1998), 1998 WL
1042283; Cott UK Ltd. v. Barber Ltd., [19971 3 All E.R. 540 (Q.B. 1997), 1997 WL 1105628; Channel
Tunnel Group Ltd. v. Balfour Beatty Constr. Ltd., [ 19931 A.C. 334 (H.L. 1993), 1993 WL 965536.
3
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and expanding the definition of an arbitration agreement" to include other ADR
processes as opposed to creating unique and definitive precedents for each process
found under the broader, all-encompassing phrase ADR.
In the 1993 case, Channel Tunnel, the House of Lords expanded the defini-
tion of an arbitration agreement to include a "dispute resolution agreement which
is nearly an immediately effective agreement to arbitrate, albeit not quite. 3 3 The
court enforced a contract clause that required the parties to go before a panel of
experts for a non-binding determination before proceeding to arbitration.34 Three
years later, in 1996, partly in reaction to the Channel Tunnel decision, Parliament
passed a new arbitration act.35  They amended the definition of "arbitration
agreement," 36 but did not differentiate arbitration from any other ADR proceeding
by describing ground rules, powers of arbitrators, or any other logistics.
During this time, England was in the midst of examining its civil justice sys-
tem by looking for ways to improve access to justice.37 Under the direction of
Lord Woolf, a committee identified a number of specific obstacles to justice faced
by parties. 38 The committee published two reports known as the Woolf Reports,
39
which encouraged the use of ADR by parties. 40 Although the reports call on
courts to encourage the use of ADR by parties, they caution against compelling
parties to use ADR.4  The final Woolf Report was encapsulated and adopted as
part of the new Civil Procedure Act of 1997.42
One year later, in 1997, in Cott UK, a party attempted to use the broader defi-
nition of arbitration from Channel Tunnel to request a stay in the proceeding and
enforce a private dispute resolution agreement requiring the parties to refer their
dispute to an expert determination proceeding.43 The court affirmatively stated
that "even where there is no arbitration clause, in the light of ... [Channel Tunnel]
32. The statutory definition of an arbitration agreement states, "[Aln agreement to submit to arbitra-
tions present or future disputes (whether contractual or not)." Arbitration Act 1996, c. 23 § 6(l)
(Eng.).
33. Channel Tunnel, 119931 A.C. at 352 (emphasis added). The Court applied concepts from the
Arbitration Act 1975 dealing with jurisdiction of international arbitration agreements to the Arbitration
Act 1950 saying, "[i]f it is appropriate to enforce a foreign jurisdiction clause under the general powers
of the court by analogy with the discretionary power under what is now [section] 4(l) of the 1950 Act
to enforce an arbitration clause by means of a stay, it must surely be legitimate to use the same powers
to enforce a dispute resolution agreement which is nearly an immediately effective agreement to arbi-
trate, albeit not quite." Id.
34. Id. at 353 (citing to the careful drafting executed by the parties when creating the two-tiered
agreement).
35. Arbitration Act 1996, c. 23 (Eng.); Christopher Newmark, i Praise of ADR, 2002 NEw L.J.
1896.
36. Arbitration Act 1996. c. 23 § 6(l) (Eng.) ("In this Part an "arbitration agreement" means an
agreement to submit to arbitration present or future disputes (whether they are contractual or not).").
37. Dr. Loukas A. Mistelis, ADR in England and Wales, 12 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 167, 173-81
(2001).
38. Id. at 178.
39. Lord Woolf, Access to Justice-hiterin Report to the Lord Chancellor on the Civil Justice System
in England and Wales (June 1995), at http://www.lcd.gov.uk/civil/interfr.htm (last visited Oct. 20,
2003); Lord Wool f, Access to Justice-Final Report (July 1996), at
http://www.lcd.gov.uk/civil/final/contents.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2003).
40. Access to Justice-Final Report, supra note 39, at Chapter 5, 18.
41. Id.
42. Civ. P. R., 1998 (Eng.); Mistelis, supra note 37, at 179.
43. Cott UK Ltd. v. Barber Ltd., 11997] 3 All E.R. 540, 548 (Q.B. 1997), 1997 WL 1105628.
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case, and in the light of the changing attitudes of our legal system, the court
plainly has jurisdiction to stay under its inherent jurisdiction, where the parties
have chosen some alternative means of dispute resolution." 44 Despite this firm
attitude, the clause was not enforced.45 The court in Cott UK imposed a higher
standard than Channel Tunnel, requiring that the parties address a number of is-
sues regarding the logistics of the expert determination proceedings (such as
length or availability of evidence production and submission to the expert). Be-
cause the parties in Cott UK had failed to specify logistical issues, the Court re-
fused to stay proceedings.46 Thus the Cott UK court helped clarify the Channel
Tunnel standard for enforcing ADR clauses by ensuring that only ADR clauses
with a bare minimum of specified logistics would be enforced.
In 1999, with the Civil Procedure Rule of 1998 in place and the prior court
decisions clarifying the scope of enforceable ADR clauses, a party asked the court
to enforce an escalating ADR clause requiring the parties to first attempt settle-
ment by negotiation in good faith, and if those negotiations failed to submit the
dispute to mediation, and if the mediation failed to arbitrate the claim.47 In Hali-
fax Financial Services Limited v. Intuitive Systems Limited, the defendant at-
tempted to apply the broad definition from Channel Tunnel as well as dicta in Cott
UK to say that the escalating ADR clause was "nearly an immediately effective
agreement to arbitrate, 48 the kind that courts can enforce.49 The court in Halifax
did not agree. 50 The court stated that Channel Tunnel only refers to determinative
procedures, differentiating determinative procedures from the non-determinative
procedures found in Halifax.5' The judge differentiated between these procedures
by saying that determinative procedures provide a final and conclusive resolution
by a third party and include such 5?rocedures as arbitration, binding expert valua-
tion and third party certification.5 Negotiation, mediation, expert appraisal and
non-binding rulings fall in the category of non-determinative procedures that
merely assist parties in resolving their own dispute but provide "no obligation to
resolve the dispute in this way. 53 The court further stated that to enforce such
clauses would be futile when the parties had previously failed at negotiating the
matter, as was the case there. The judicial standard for enforcing ADR clauses
had grown to require determinative ADR clauses that specified a bare minimum of
process logistics.
Based on the above cases, judicial support for the use of ADR proceedings
seems strong. Although courts have not enforced agreements to mediate, courts




47. Halifax Fin. Serv. Ltd., v. Intuitive Sys. Ltd., 119991 1 All E.R 303 (Q.B. 1998), 1998 WL
1042283, *2.
48. Id. at *6 (citing Channel Tunnel Group Ltd. v. Balfour Beatty Constr. Ltd., 119931 A.C. 334,
353 (H.L. 1993), 1993 WL965536.
49. /d.
50. Id.
51. Id. at *7.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at *8.
5
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clauses. Prior to the Woolf Reports, in 1996, Lord Woolf heard Frank Cowl &
Ors v. Plymouth City Council, and called on courts to support the use of ADR
whenever appropriate to minimize the involvement of the courts.55 In his opinion,
Lord Woolf scolded the complainants for not proceeding with an established
"complaints procedure" outside the court system. 56 In dicta, the judge stated,
"[Clourts should not permit ... proceedings for judicial review to proceed if a
significant part of the issues between the parties could be resolved outside the
litigation process."
57
Three months later, the Court of Appeals similarly reprimanded a defendant
who, although he had rightfully requested an award of attorney's fees, was refused
the award of costs because the defendant had refused to accept an offer to mediate
prior to trial.5' Even though the court agreed with the defendant in the case and
dismissed the claim, the court stated that "schooled mediators are now able to
achieve results satisfactory to both parties in many cases which are quite beyond
the power of lawyers and courts to achieve., 59 Furthering this support of media-
tion, even when faced with the possibility of no settlement, the High Court of
Justice Chancery Division noted that mediation can still assist parties on the path
to resolution when the parties assess the strengths and weaknesses of their case
during mediation.6 °
The public policy asserted now by judges characterizes the growing support
for ADR in England.
B. Enforcement of ADR clauses in the United States
1. Binding Processes
A similar pattern of growing support for ADR exists in the United States.
Since 1925, American courts have enforced arbitration clauses under the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA)6' and its state counterparts. 62 Prior to the FAA, courts




58. Dunnett v. Railtrack PIc, [2002] I W.L.R. 2434 (C.A. 2002), 2002 WL 45445.
59. Id. But see Societ Internationale de Telecommunications Aeronautiques S.C. v. The Wyatt Co.
(UK), [2002.1 E.W.H.C. 2401 (Ch. 2002), 2002 WL 31599703 (holding that where refusal to mediate is
reasonable, attorney's costs will still be awarded).
60. Hurst v. Leeming, [20031 I Lloyd's Rep. 379 (Ch. 2002), 2002 WL 1039525 (holding however
that when faced with no real prospect of success, a party may refuse to proceed only in the face of high
risk of severe penalization).
61. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000). Section 2 of the FAA provides for enforcement of arbitration agreements
stating:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving
commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transac-
tion, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit
to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall
be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract. Id.
62. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-108-212(a) (1987); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-22-202 (1999); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 9:4202 (2000); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 251, §§ I - 19 (2000); MINN. STAT. § 572.19
(1998); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-567.1 - 20 (1999); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-5-303(d) (2000). State
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confined enforcement of arbitration clauses ostensibly in deference to contract
law.6 3 American courts parroted the English practice of not enforcing arbitration
clauses. Thus, Congress passed the FAA to "overcome judicial reluctance to al-
low arbitration, rooted in an antiquated unwillingness to cede power to other deci-
sion-making tribunals." 64 For half a century, the U.S. Supreme Court remained
reluctant, refusing to enforce arbitration clauses found in contracts dealing with
certain substantive law areas. For example, in 1956, the Supreme Court held in
Wilko v. Swan that pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate would not be enforced
when the underlying issue dealt with statutory issues unique to the Securities Ex-
change Act. 65 The Court at that time invalidated the parties' agreement to arbi-
trate, holding that their right to a trial under the Securities Exchange Act is more
important than their right to an "economical and adequate solution . . . through
arbitration."
66
In 1987, the Supreme Court issued an opinion in the case Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., decisively abandoning the previous atti-
tude towards arbitration agreements by enforcing an arbitration agreement without
concern for the statutory basis of the claim.67 The Court now places responsibility
on Congress to set forth guidelines as to when arbitration clauses should and
should not be enforced. 68  Without such congressional waivers, the Court pre-
sumes the arbitrability of the clause.69 Thirty-four years after Wilko, the SupremeCourt ruled that arbitration agreements are merely choice of forum clauses, rather
legislatures derive these statutes from the Uniform Arbitration Act. For extensive information about
the development of the Uniform Arbitration Act, see Recent Developments: The Uniform Arbitration
Act, 1988 J. Disp. RESOL. 247; Recent Developments: The Uniform Arbitration Act, 1989 J. DisP.
RESOL. 237; Recent Developments: The Uniform Arbitration Act, 1990 J. DisP. RESOL. 471; Recent
Developments: The Uniform Arbitration Act, 1991 J. DisP. RESOL. 417; Recent Developments: The
Uniform Arbitration Act, 1992 J. Disp. RESOL. 411; Recent Developments: The Uniform Arbitration
Act, 1993 J. Disp. RESOL. 397; Recent Developments: The Uniform Arbitration Act, 1994 J. DisP.
RESOL. 311; Recent Developments: The Uniform Arbitration Act, 1995 J. DisP, RESOL. 389; Recent
Developments: The Uniform Arbitration Act, 1996 J. Disp. RESOL. 477; Recent Developments: The
Uniform Arbitration Act, 1997 J. DisP. RESOL. 281; Recent Developments: The Uniform Arbitration
Act, 1998 J. DisP. RESOL. 233; Recent Developments: The Uniform Arbitration Act, 1999 J. DisP.
REsOL. 219; Recent Developments: The Uniform Arbitration Act, 2000 J. DisP. RESOL. 459; Recent
Developments: The Uniform Arbitration Act, 2001 J. DisP. RESOL. 387; Recent Developments: The
Uniform Arbitration Act, 2002 J. Disp. RESOL. 469. However, in 1984, the Supreme Court ruled that
Congress has "declared a national policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of states to
require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve be
arbitration," therefore stating that the FAA preempts state law. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S.
I, 10 (1984).
63. Although courts can still enforce arbitration clauses under the general theory of contract law, the
FAA was enacted to encourage reluctant courts to enforce private arbitration agreements. Mastro-
buono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995).
64. Westbrook Int'l, LLC v. Westbrook Tech., Inc., 17 F. Supp. 2d 681, 683 (E.D. Mich. 1998)
(citing Ferro Corp. v. Garrison Indus., Inc., 142 F.3d 926, 932 (6th Cir. 1998)).
65. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427,430-38 (1953).
66. Id. at 438.
67. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625 (1985) (finding
"no warrant in the Arbitration Act for implying in every contract within its ken a presumption against
arbitration of statutory claims.").
68. Id. at 627.
69. Id. at 628.
7
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than waivers of substantive rights, expressly overruling its previous decision in
Wilko.
70
In a series of cases over the last twenty years, the Supreme Court has enunci-
ated its shift in attitude from apprehensive to outright favored status of arbitra-
tion.7' In 1983, Justice Brennan wrote for the Supreme Court:
[Qjuestions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for
the federal policy favoring arbitration. . . . The Arbitration Act estab-
lishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of
arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the
problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an
allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.
72
Although the precedent is clearly set for enforcing arbitration clauses, courts
differ on exactly what an arbitration clause entails. Judge Posner constructed a
broad definition of arbitration when he amusingly stated that "short of authorizing
trial by battle or ordeal or, more doubtfully, by a panel of three monkeys, parties
can stipulate to whatever procedures they want to govern the arbitration of their
disputes. 73 Although the FAA does not explicitly state what arbitration is, it does
call for a process that "settle[s]" disputes,74 which most commentators have read
to imply the requirement of final and binding determination, excluding other non-
binding ADR processes.75
2. Non-Binding Processes
The scope of the FAA has become so broad that other types of ADR proc-
esses have been enforced by analogy to arbitration despite others' call for the need
of a binding element. 76 AMF Inc. v. Brunswick Corp. provides an example.77 In
70. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
71. See Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983); Gilmer v. Inter-
state/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
72. Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24-25. This favoritism has come with a lot of criticism questioning
the extent courts enforce arbitration at the expense of certain rights including the right to a class action
suit. See, e.g., Jean Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court's Prefer-
ence for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637 (1996) (questioning the Court's favoritism as a
"myth that commercial arbitration served a substantial public purpose and should be favored regardless
of the parties' intentions." Id. at 660.) [hereinafter Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?].
73. Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 709 (7th Cir. 1994).
74. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000) (directing courts to enforce written agreements "to settle by arbitration")
(emphasis added).
75. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.4, cmt. 5 (2002) (emphasizing the finality of
arbitration as a distinguishing factor from other dispute resolution techniques); IAN R. MACNEIL,
AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION, NATIONALIZATION, INTERNATIONALIZATION 7
(1992) (describing arbitration awards as "binding" and akin to judgments); Amy J. Schmitz, Ending a
Mud Bowl: Defining Arbitration s Finality Through Functional Analysis, 37 GA. L. REV. 123, 126,
178-89 (2002) (clearly stating that the arbitration's finality differentiates itself from other processes but
questioning courts' naming of arbitration clauses as such when providing for expanded judicial review
of the arbitration award or agreement); Wesley A. Sturges, Arbitration - What Is It?, 35 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1031, 1032 (1960) (describing arbitration as a conclusive process).
76. Supra note 75 and accompanying text.
77. 621 F. Supp. 456 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
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Brunswick the parties had agreed to submit disputes to a third party for an advi-
sory opinion." The court applied Section 2 of the FAA, defining arbitration
loosely enough to include any submission of a dispute to a third party because,
"viewed in light of reasonable commercial expectations," the non-binding process
would settle the case. 79 Another district court extended this analysis by saying the
FAA conceptually embraces all alternative means of dispute resolution, including
mediation.8 °
The Third Circuit, however, refused to treat mediation clauses as arbitration
clauses, reasoning that the specific statute governing the claim probably did not
contemplate the enforcement of such a non-binding clause.8 Additionally, a New
York court has addressed this issue saying that parties who want a court to enforce
such a non-binding procedure must be clear, explicit, and unequivocal in its lan-
82guage. Therefore, in the United States it is unclear what type of ADR clauses
courts will enforce and what must be included in a clause to ensure its enforceabil-
ity.
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In Cable & Wireless Plc v. IMB U.K. Ltd.,83 the High Court of Justice Queens
Bench Division84 had to decide whether to enforce an ADR clause found in the
parties' Global Frameworking Agreement (GFA).85 Although the parties brought
two separate claims before the court, the court stated that the application for a stay
in the proceedings in favor of enforcing the ADR clause must be decided first, as
86the other claim becomes moot upon granting a stay.
The court began its investigation by addressing C&W's assertion that the con-
tract language allowing parties' to initiate court proceedings whilst pursuing alter-
native procedural options demonstrates the parties' desire to pursue any and all
legal options. 87 The court used a narrower reading of the language. Because the
parties implemented an escalating ADR clause, the court inferred that there was a
"mutual intention that litigation was to be resorted to as a last resort. The courtdid not ignore the fact that the clause clearly states the possibility of both court
78. Id. at 459. One practice guide provides a definition for "advisory arbitration," clearly stating
that it is non-binding. See EDWARD A. DAVER, MANUAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION: ADR LAW AND
PRACTICE (1996).
79. Brunswik, 621 F. Supp. at 461. See also Wolsey Ltd. v. Foodmaker Inc., 144 F.3d 1205 (9th
Cir. 1998) (enforcing a non-binding arbitration provision in a restaurant franchise agreement under the
FAA); Russell County Sch. Bd. v. Conseco Life Ins. Co., 2001 WL 1593233 (W.D. Va. 2001) (enforc-
ing a non-binding arbitration clause under the FAA); Cecala v. Moore, 982 F. Supp. 609 (N.D. Ill.
1997) (granting a stay in favor of contractual mediation clause based on the Illinois Uniform Arbitra-
tion Act).
80. Allied Sanitation Inc. v. Waste Mgmt. Holdings Inc., 97 F. Supp. 2d 320 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
81. Harrison v. Nissan Motor Corp., I I I F.3d 343 (3d Cir. 1997).
82. Gen. Ry. Signal Corp. v. L.K. Comstock & Co., 678 N.Y.S.2d 208 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998).
83. [2002] 2 All E.R. 1041,2002 WL 31442553.
84. The High Court of Justice Queens Bench Division is somewhat parallel to the district court level
in the United States Federal Government. However, cases heard by the High Court can appeal directly
to the House of Lords, England's highest court.
85. C&W, 2002 WL 31442553 at *1.
86. Id.
87. Id. at *5.
88. Id.
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proceedings and ADR processes running simultaneously.8 9 Instead, the court
interpreted this language to allow "injunctive or other preservative or interim re-
lief in cases so urgent that they cannot await the outcome of the various stages of
negotiation." 90 By using this narrow interpretation, the court dismissed C&W's
argument against a stay in the proceeding. 9'
Next, the court looked at the words of the escalating ADR clause to determine
if the clause more closely resembled a negotiation clause, as posited by the plain-
tiff, or an arbitration clause, as argued by the defendant. 92 The court reasoned
that, because the clause specified a process, in that it detailed the procedure for
choosing a process, it was more focused and detailed than a simple good faith
negotiation clause and therefore akin to an arbitration clause. 93 This "process
choosing" portion of the clause specified an organization, the Centre for Effective
Dispute Resolution (CEDR),94 to recommend a process for the parties. The court
placed a lot of faith in this portion of the clause because CEDR has developed
model mediation procedures, standardizing the "terms upon which the parties may
proceed" and therefore represented concrete standards a court could enforce. 95
The court stated that the plaintiffs attempt to analogize the ADR clause to a
negotiation clause simply did not apply to this situation. Historically, courts do
not enforce negotiation clauses because of "insufficient objective criteria to decide
whether one or both parties were in compliance or breach of such a provision.
The court then focused on the ability to determine party compliance with the con-
tract and therefore differentiated between a mere negotiation clause and this
clause by focusing on the ability to discern party compliance by its ability to fol-
low and abide by CEDR's hypothetical recommendation.97
The court expanded this rule by encouraging enforcement of ADR clauses
absent detailed procedures.98 Responding to future attempts to analogize ADR
clauses to negotiation clauses, this court said ambiguous ADR clauses are still
enforceable because "a sufficiently certain and definable minimum duty of par-
ticipation should not be hard to find." 99
The court recognized the delicacy of this distinction, but called on courts to
become better acquainted with the more established ADR movement in Eng-
land.' 00 Judge Colman cited to four indicia of established practice: "[1] well-





93. Id. at *6.
94. Both the ADR clause and Court refer to the ADR provider as the Centre for Dispute Resolution,
however, the center's website clearly demarcates itself as the Centre for Effective Dispute Resolution.
See http://www.cedr.co.uk.org (emphasis added) (last visited Oct. 15, 2003).
95. C&W, 2002 WL 31442553 at *8.
96. Id. at *6-7.
97. Id. at *7. "[f one party simply fails to co-operate in the appointment of a mediator in accor-
dance with CEDR's model procedure or to send documents to such mediator as is appointed or to
attend upon the mediator when he has called for a first meeting, there will clearly be an ascertainable
breach of the agreement." Id.
98. Id. at *8.
99. Id.
100. ld. at *7.
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and [4] procedures designed to achieve settlement."' 0'1 The court then highlighted
public policy supporting enforcement and generalized support for ADR. Eight
months earlier, Lord Justice Brooke, in Dunnet v. Railtrack, included lengthy
passages of stories of mediation success "beyond the power of lawyers and
courts."'' 0 2 The court pointed to the Civil Procedure Rule 1.4, which requires
judges to engage in active case management by "encouraging the parties to use an
alternative dispute resolution procedure,"' 0 3 and other English court precedent
showing strong support for ADR.1°4 Furthermore, the court felt public policy
demanded the enforcement of the ADR clause.'
0 5
Because it found that the parties had identified a specific procedure for detail-
ing an ADR process within which they would engage, and public policy beckons
judges to encourage the use of ADR, the court enforced the GFA between IBM
and C&W and granted a stay of the proceedings.
10 6
V. COMMENT
A number of English authors hail the C&W decision as decisive support and
encouragement for ADR in England. David Miles, a solicitor with Glovers Solici-
tors, London, 1 7 cites to C&W as a "ringing endorsement" of ADR in contract
clauses. 0 8 Likewise, CEDR published an article calling the C&W decision "the
latest piece of evidence to demonstrate the courts' firm commitment to media-
tion. ' 9 One author even salutes the C&W decision for resolving "a tension that
has existed ... [in] the English courts ... since the early 1990s, [making] it clear
that they are, in principle, in [favor] of the enforcement of clauses which provide
for alternative methods of resolving disputes in advance of arbitration or litiga-
tion.""o If, as these authors indicate, then the C&W decision shows great support
for ADR, the question becomes, ADR at what cost?
A. Overconfidence of the Court
If the court attempted to show support of and acceptance of ADR by enforc-
ing the C&W ADR clause, then it did so by going outside the scope of case law
precedent. Based on Channel Tunnel,"' Cott UK,"12 and Halifax,113 one would
101. Id.
102. Id., quoting Dunnett v. Railtrack Plc, [2002] 1 W.L.R. 2434, 2436-37 (C.A. 2002), 2002 WL
45445 at*3.
103. Civ. P. R. 1.4, 1998 (Eng.).
104. C&W, 2002 WL 31442553 at *7-8.
105. Id. at *7.
106. Id.
107. See Glovers Solicitors, Alternative Dispute Resolution, at http://www.glovers.co.uk (last visited
Oct. 9, 2003).
108. David Miles, News Updates, Courts Endorse ADR and Mediation - January 2003, at
http://www.glovers.co.uk/news.arch.asp (last visited Oct. 14, 2003).
109. Ctr. for Effective Disp. Resol., Cable & Wireless v. IBM: Court Enforces Contractual Commit-
ment to Mediate, at http://www.cedr.co.uk/index.php?location=/news/archive/20021017.htm (last
visited Oct. 9, 2003).
110. Newmark, supra note 35.
111. Channel Tunnel Group Ltd. v. Balfour Beatty Constr. Ltd., [1993] A.C. 334 (H.L. 1993), 1993
WL 965536.
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not expect the court to enforce the broad ADR clause drafted in C&W. The clause
itself did not provide specifics of any kind about the logistics of the ADR proce-
dure. Whether the process would be binding or non-binding, or whether a panel
of neutrals or a single neutral would preside over the process was not even dis-
cussed. 14 By failing to provide even a bare minimum of specified logistics, this
clause fails the test set forth in Cott. Furthermore, Halifax requires that the proce-
dure be a determinative proceeding. This clause fails to even mention a specific
process by which a judge could ascertain the determinative element of the process.
Therefore, it fails to meet the Halifax test as well. Although restricted by later
opinions, Channel Tunnel allows the C&W court the greatest latitude by way of its
expansive standard of enforceability. Channel Tunnel requires only that the ADR
clause include a "dispute resolution agreement which is nearly an immediate ef-
fective agreement to arbitrate, albeit not quite."" 5 Still, under this expansive
standard, the C&W ADR clause should fail because in Channel Tunnel the parties
at least defined a process by which the judge could enforce participation. In C&W
the parties merely agreed to a preliminary process by which a dispute resolution
process would be picked.
In C&W, the judge enforced the ADR clause in an overzealous attempt to en-
courage the use of ADR in a manner intimated by the Civil Procedure Rules. The
judge held too much confidence in, and placed too much responsibility on, the
reputation of the CEDR." 16 Although the Civil Procedure Rules explicitly encour-
age the use of ADR," 7 the Rule defines this as a discretionary measure." 18 The
judge presumed that the CEDR would recommend mediation for the parties if he
enforced the clause. However, CEDR offers a variety of ADR services ranging
from arbitration to mediation." 9 The judge based his assumption on the fact that
CEDR has published a list of well known model mediation rules. 20 If the C&W
ADR clause had in fact contemplated or required the specific use of mediation in
addition to requiring the use of a CEDR trained and certified mediator, why did it
not say so? 121 The drafters of the C&W ADR clause need not have looked far for
suggested model language to clarify their ADR clause. CEDR has a set of model
contract language readily available for attorneys specifying suggested procedures
112. Cott UK Ltd. v. Barber Ltd., [1997] 3 All E.R. 540 (Q.B. 1997), 1997 WL 1105628.
113. Halifax Fin. Serv. Ltd. v. Intuitive Sys. Ltd., [1999] I All E.R. 303 (Q.B. 1998), 1998 WL
1042283.
114. C&W, 2002 WL 31442553 at *2.
115. Channel Tunnel, [1993] A.C. at 352.
116. C& W, 2002 WL 31442552 at *6.
117. Civ. P. R. 1.4(e), 1998 (Eng.) (urging courts to "[encourage] the parties to use an alternative
dispute resolution procedure").
118. Id. (stating that ADR procedures should be encouraged "if the court considers that appropriate
and facilitat[es] the use of such procedure").
119. CEDR offers a "range of professional dispute resolution, training and consultancy solutions
using the foremost practitioners in the field." Ctr. For Effective Disp. Resol., What is CEDR?, at
http://www.cedr.co.uk/index.php?location=/about/default.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2003).
120. C&W, 2002 WL 31442553 at *6. CEDR published an 8th Edition of these rules in October
2002. See Model Mediation Procedure and Agreement. (8th ed. 2002), at
http://www.cedr.co.uk/library/documents/MMPA_8thEdition.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2003).
12 1. See supra Part 11.
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and rules. 122 It seems the drafters simply failed to consult this readily available
source.
More troubling, the parties risk CEDR going out of business at some point
during the twelve-year term of the contract. A court may find it difficult to en-
force an ADR clause when the organization assigned to recommend the ADR
procedure is no longer available. This is especially true when the court has lim-
ited enforceability of the clause based on the reputation of the service provider.
B. General Implications of the Decision
The United States has experienced a boom in the use of pre-dispute ADR
contract clauses fueled by the certainty that nearly all types of clauses will be
enforced by the court.123 However, courts have enforced or disregarded virtually
identical ADR clauses in both the United States and England. 124 So when drafting
a pre-dispute ADR contract clause, how is an attorney to ensure court enforcement
of the clause? 25 At the very least, a reasonably specific clause stands a greater
chance of enforcement under general contract theory. With this in mind, a num-
ber of American ADR organizations provide suggested contract language for at-
torney use.' 26 Each sample clause is highly specific and tailored to the unique
aspects of the ADR procedure contemplated in the event of a dispute. For exam-
ple, JAMS 127 sets out ten different process combinations for an attorney to use in
122. See Model ADR Contract Clauses, at
http://www.cedr.co.uk/library/documents/contract clauses.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2003).
123. See Lisa Bingham, Self-Determination in Dispute System Design and Employment Arbitration,
56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 873 (2002); Sarah R. Cole, Uniform Arbitration: "One Size Fits All" Does Not
Fit, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 759 (2001); Joseph T. McLaughlin, Arbitrability: Current Trends
in the United States, 59 ALB. L. REV. 905 (1996); Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?, supra note
72.
124. See supra Part III.
125. There are many other issues to consider when drafting an ADR clause besides the process speci-
fied. See Lawrence R. Mills & Thomas J. Brewer, ADR Drafting Tips: Courts may Refuse to Enforce
'Incoherent Hybrids' and Overreaching Provisions, DisP. RESOL. MAG. Spring 2002, at 23 (examining
issues such as 1) preconditions to arbitration, 2) illusory arbitration clauses, 3) limitation of remedies,
and 4) one-sided and 'overreaching' procedural provisions.) This Note, however, focuses just on the
process specified by the parties, not the scope of the clause.
126. See Am. Arb. Ass'n, Drafting Dispute Resolution Clauses - A Practical Guide, at
http://www.adr.org (last visited Oct. 14, 2003) [hereinafter AAA, Practical Guide]; JAMS, JAMS
Guide to Dispute Resolution Clauses for Commercial Contracts, at http://www.jamsadr.com (last
visited Oct. 15, 2003) [hereinafter JAMS, Commercial Contracts]. Interestingly, the English ADR
provider CEDR offers similar model language in its publication Model ADR Contract Clauses, supra
note 122. Many practitioners and professors have also written articles suggesting language for attor-
neys and identifying problems in different dispute resolution clauses. See Miles, supra note 108; Jean
Sternlight, Drafting a "Bulletproof" Consumer Arbitration Agreement: Is it Possible?, in
ARBITRATION OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL DISPUTES, at 763 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course, Hand-
book Series No. B0-00C2, 1999); Thomas J. Stipanowich, Contract and Conflict Management, 2001
Wis. L. REV. 831; David K. Taylor, Avoiding Unnecessary Punches: Skillful Crafting of Alternative
Dispute Resolution Contract Clauses, TENN. B.J., April 2000, at 20; David E. Wagoner, Tailoring the
ADR Clause in International Contracts, ARB. J., June 1993, at 77.
127. JAMS provides dispute resolution services, including arbitration, mediation, private judging,
mini-trials, neutral fact finding, and ADR training to clients and their local, national, and global com-
munities. JAMS, Who We Are, at http://www.jamsadr.com/who-we are.asp (last visited Oct. 9,
2003).
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drafting a detailed plan of action."' Similarly, the American Arbitration Associa-
tion (AAA)' 29 provides model language for three processes; arbitration, negotia-
tion, and mediation. 30 Two broad similarities between these suggested contract
language models are: 1) the naming of process (even if more than one allowed)
and 2) rules of each process. JAMS stresses the need for absolute clarity and
specificity suggesting clauses that cite to such details as the number of persons on
an arbitration panel. 3 ' Recognizing the importance of drafting clear and precise
ADR clauses, a California court recently stated:
[Wie spend too much time trying to make sense out of arbitration agree-
ments precisely because litigants spend too little time in drafting them.
Increasingly, we have been presented with incoherent hybrids and bizarre
mutations of supposed agreements for judicial or contractual arbitration.
Oftentimes the 'remedy' is worse than the disease.'
32
It is important to know what factors a court will look at when deciding
whether or not to enforce an ADR contract clause. In the United States, broad
enforcement of ADR clauses by the courts is derivative of the FAA. Section 2 of
the FAA says "settle by arbitration."'' 33  What constitutes "arbitration" when
courts have enforced a variety of ADR clauses using different named proc-
esses? 134 Courts seem to look to see if the process is geared toward a final settle-
ment. 35 In reality, only binding arbitration can guarantee a dispositive outcome.
Non-binding arbitration and early neutral evaluation essentially provide advisory
opinions which parties may or may not follow. Mediation and good-faith negotia-
tion do not even provide an opinion, advisory or otherwise, but provide structures
that encourage settlement, in no way guaranteeing a final resolution of the dispute.
Nonetheless, courts continue to use the FAA to enforce ADR clauses calling for
non-binding processes.
The ADR movement is nearing a watershed. It has experienced considerable
growth in the last twenty years due to mounting support in the legal community.
However, its acceptance has gone nearly unchecked by empirical research.1
36
128. JAMS sets forth the following headings for its ADR contract clauses; Negotiation Only, Media-
tion Only, Streamlined Arbitration Only, Comprehensive Arbitration Only, Negotia-
tion/Mediation/Arbitration, Negotiation/Mediation, Negotiation/Arbitration, and Media-
tion/Arbitration. See JAMS, Commercial Contracts, supra note 126.
129. AAA has provided dispute resolution services since 1926. AAA provides arbitration, mediation,
fact-finding, mini-trial, and partnering, as well as ADR systems design, education and training. See
Am. Arb. Ass'n, About Us Overview, at http://www.adr.org/index (last visited Oct. 14, 2003).
130. AAA details these three specific procedures, then it lays out model clauses for specific contexts,
including International Disputes, Construction Disputes, Employment Disputes, Patent Disputes,
Textile Disputes, and Financial Disputes. See AAA, Practical Guide, supra note 126.
131. Id. at Part IV.C. Emp 2 (naming one or three persons to be on the arbitration panel); JAMS,
Commercial Contracts, supra note 126, at Part C-I (specifying the arbitration is to be heard by a "sole
arbitrator").
132. Nat'l Union Ins. Co. v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
133. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000) (stating that "a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to
settle by arbitration").
134. See supra Part III.
135. See supra Part HI.




Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2003, Iss. 2 [2003], Art. 12
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2003/iss2/12
No. 2] An ADR Clause by Any Other Name Might Smell as Sweet 561
Articles trumpeting means of improvement have inundated the canon,' 37 such as
sociological studies that have shown people are more satisfied with mediation
than litigation. However, Professor Deborah Hensler claims that these studies are
flawed in that they were conducted under the process of non-binding arbitration,
not mediation. 38 This stems from a dearth of concrete definitions for, or under-
standing of, the panoply of ADR procedures available. 39 If courts continue to
enforce broad undefined ADR clauses such as the one found in C&W, this prob-
lem will persist.
Professor Amy Schmitz explains the drawbacks of the new expansive ap-
proach to defining ADR, writing that,
the irony is that the same pro-arbitration impulses that have driven ex-
pansion of arbitration are also fueling courts' misapplication of arbitra-
tion remedies, which actually dilutes the significance of arbitration and
threatens the integrity of the functional scheme underlying arbitration
statutes. '40
Fear does not make the blood of big litigation firms representing large corpo-
rations run cold; they can regulate and shape the processes to which they agreed.
The proliferation of corporate adhesion contracts including pre-dispute arbitration
clauses is astounding.' 4 ' This could be hailed as a brilliant show of support and
acceptance by companies; however, it should also be met with inquiry and de-
bate. 42 When ADR is blindly and broadly enforced, the impact and benefits of
ADR might be lessened. Unchecked, this growth turns into a meaningless and
institutionalized enforcement system lacking the flexibility and uniqueness that
exists at the heart of ADR.
143
Professor Carrie Menkel-Meadow, expounding on the ideas of Laura Nader,
discusses the United States' blanket exportation of Americanized ideas of alterna-
tive dispute resolution to other countries.' 44 England has looked to the United
137. Id.
138. Id at 86-87.
139. See, e.g., Alison E. Gerencser, Alternative Dispute Resolution Has Morphed into Mediation:
Standards of Conduct Must Be Changed, 50 FLA. L. REV. 843 (1998) (arguing that the term "media-
tion" has come to be used to describe everything from mandatory arbitration to pre-trial settlement
conferences, and that as a result professional standards of conduct are needed to provide an accurate
view of mediation both to practitioners and the public). Some look at the ADR movement through a
Darwinian lens; allow the different processes to flourish unchecked, and in time the legal jungle will
contract away the unfit processes that lurk among us. Nancy A. Welsh, All in the Family: Darwin and
the Evolution of Mediation, Disp. RESOL. MAG., Winter 2001, at 20. But, "there is little hard evidence,
few statistics, and limited systematic public policy research to prove that any of the proposed ways is
the right way, or even an effective way." Bingham, supra note 123, at 879.
140. See Schmitz, supra note 75, at 124.
141. See Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?, supra note 72.
142. Id.
143. One English solicitor even said, "Such a strong endorsement by the Court is leading many com-
mentators to suggest that the "alternative" in ADR should mean litigation or arbitration, making me-
diation and related procedures the main means of resolving disputes." Miles, supra note 108.
144. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Correspondences and Contradictions in International and Domestic
Conflict Resolution: Lessons from General Theory and Varied Contexts, 2003 J. Disp. RESOL. 319,
339 (questioning the use of a universal theory of ADR), referring to Laura Nader & Elisabetta Grande,
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States for guidance in developing ADR within its court system. 45 In an attempt to
rival the United States' dominance in the ADR field, England may have expanded
the scope of their enforcement too broadly.
When drafting a dispute resolution clause, attorneys should lay out as many
details of the procedure as possible to ensure court enforcement, and more impor-
tantly to match the desired procedure envisioned by the parties for whom the
agreement is drafted. Court uncertainty as to what is and what is not an arbitra-
tion/mediation/advisory opinion clause makes clarity and specificity imperative.
Clearly, what is considered arbitration to one judge is not arbitration to another.
The confusion facing the ADR community concerning process definition, demar-
cating where one begins and another ends, may lead to ebb of support for ADR,
for one should not support what one cannot clearly define. Haphazard enforce-
ment by the courts does not help alleviate the situation. For the practicing attor-
ney, it is most important to use clear and specific language in drafting the logisti-
cal elements of the ADR procedure agreed to in an ADR clause. Through better
drafting, the legal community may come to a bright line standard for what is or is
not a specific ADR clause.
For the benefit of the client as well as the betterment of ADR, setting forth
the process to be used, defining the process clearly, and referring to established
rules when drafting an ADR clause are paramount. Even though the High Court
of Justice Queens Bench enforced a broad and undefined ADR clause, one cannot
ensure such a clause will be enforced again. As courts become more educated on
the various ADR processes encompassed under the umbrella of 'ADR,' they
should be less likely to enforce poorly drafted clauses with unspecified terms.
The public policy interest in supporting ADR will be greatly outweighed by the
unjust enforcement of vague and undefined terms.
VI. CONCLUSION
The High Court of Justice Queens Bench provided needed support for ADR
by enforcing a very broad ADR clause in C&W. However, in so doing, the court
may have interrupted the long term development of the movement in that country.
By enforcing such a broad ADR clause, the concept of specificity loses signifi-
cance and impact. This type of clause is not recommended by experts in the field
and probably would not be enforced in American courts. Attorneys drafting ADR
clauses for their clients, whether in England or in the United States, should spell
out the actual procedure to be used in the event of a future dispute. This not only
encourages court enforcement, but client understanding as well. Even if a court
enforces the procedure, it may be far more important for the client to understand
the parameters of the procedure prior to court involvement.
Current Illusions and Delusions about Conflict Management - In Africa and Elsewhere, 27 LAW &
SOC. INQUIRY 573 (2002).
145. See Lord Woolf's recommendations at the end of Chapter 18 of Access to Justice-Interim Re-
port, supra note 39. (suggesting that "developments abroad, particularly those in the United States...
in relation to ADR should be monitored").
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Despite the Court's enforcement of the ADR clause in C&W, attorneys in
England and the United States should not rely on it as model language for a feasi-
ble pre-dispute ADR contract clause.
ALYSON CARREL
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